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I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine laboring away at work all day, only to receive a phone call from your 
elderly parent who tells you that police officers have arrived at your home and are 
making a copy of your personal computer's password-protected hard drive-without 
a warrant. This is exactly what happened to 52-year-old Ray Andrus. ' Without a 
doubt, any judge would suppress evidence collected in such a manner, right? Wrong. 
The court in United Swtes v. Andrus1 refused to suppress the seized evidence, 
holding that Ray Andrus's 91-year-old father had "apparent authority" over a 
password-protected private computer located in Ray's personal bedroom.3 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution• sets the ultimate regulation as 
to how the government can conduct searches and seizures.5 Specifically. it states 
that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."(' Over 
time, courts have carved out many exceptions to the warrant requirement.7 One of 
those is the exception allowing a third party to give consent to a warrantless search 
or seizure when that party has some interest or control over the property being 
searched or seized.8 Even without bringing inro account the complexities of 
technology and password-protl.lcted data. dealing with this exception by itself has 
been a thorn in the sid~ of many courtsY Then throw into the mix not only personal 
computers, but also their ability to house voluminous amounts of data that can be, 
and often is, password-protected. ln terms or personal computers and warrantless 
searches of them. how much latitude do third parties have in authorizing law 
enforcement to search a computer that is owned by someone else, but is located in 
the same household? The Andrus case is among the first to attempt to tackle the 
ld 
1 United States v. Andrus, 4lS3 F· .3d 711 (I Oth C ir. 2007). 
2/d 
'!d at 722. 
·•u .S. C'ONST. amend. IV. 
5/d. The Fourth Amendment in lt'tal ily reads: 
The right of the people: 10 be s.:cure 111 their persons, huuses, pr.pers, and cfkcts. 
against unreasonable searches and ~eizurc~, sh:dl not be violated. and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon prohabl.: caus.:. ~upp011eJ hy Oath or aflinnation. and 
particularly describing the place (<) oe ~ea rched . and the p.:rsnus or things to be ~eizcd. 
7Thc Fllurth Amenumcm: Search and Sei1ure L<nv. http .:!www.house.kg.statl:.llln.u~! 
hnVpubs//ss/ clss4th.htm 9 (last \ biteJ Mar. '). 2009). :\mtm~ those exceptions are the plain 
view doctrine, the automobile exception. and cxigt·m. or emergency. circumstances. Jd. This 
Note focuses on ·'third-pany consent.'' <111 e (tension nf the: ctmsent ,·:-,.ception. The con~l!nt 
exception allows a law enforcement officer t<' cc•ndu,; t a warr::mtlc·5s search or seizure ,,hen he 
or she reasonably believes a party ha~ !he: authnri1y tu consen! to suo.:h activity. /d. 
818 AM. JvR. 20 Pru()j'ol Faus ~ M~ I \200~) 
9/d 
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issue and shows how courts arc having a difficult time dealing with third-party 
consent to search computers. 10 
One thing is certain: The courts are will ing to admit that passwords on computers 
are synonymous with physical locks on physical containers, but are struggling to 
apply Fourth Amendment protections to warrantless third-party consent searches of 
password-protected computers. This Note will look at not only the third-party 
consent exception to the Fourth Amendment, but also more specifically, the legal 
issues raised when that exception is used to admit evidence from a warrantless search 
of a password-protected computer. At issue are two differing viewpoints of how to 
deal with computers: whether the computer is s imply a physical box that can be 
looked at to view the contents, or whether passwords on the computer liken it to a 
'' locked box" that protects the virtual contents. ' 1 Technological advances can allow 
law enforcement to use forensic software and devices to access computer data 
without regard to any password " locks" that may be activated on the computer. 12 In 
the Andrus dissent, Judge Monroe G. McKay wrote that "the unconstrained ability of 
law enforcement to . . . bypass password protection without first determining 
whether such passwords have been enabled .. . dangerously sidestep[s] the Fourth 
Amendment. " 13 
In totality, this Note sets forth that it is unacceptable tor law enforcement to 
ignore the presence of passwords simply because they may not be immediately 
visible. Furthermore. it is contrary to the Fourth Amendment for law enforcement to 
rely on third parties who grant access to search the data without knowledge of the 
password to unlock the data. Principles hammered out over time for searches and 
seizures of physically locked objects 1 ~ can easily be transposed and extended to fit 
the virtual world while still providing people the protections of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
This Note examines how Fourth Amendment protections are being sidestepped 
because of the problems raised in dealing with passwords on personal computers as 
locks, specifical ly when a third party consents to a warTantless search of a computer. 
Part II of this Note will look at the background of the Fourth Amendment and the 
third-party consent exception. Part Ill provides a basic understanding of how 
computer hard drives, operating systems, and forensic software function. Part IV 
10Pamela A . MacLean. Courts Grapple With Computer Searches: Is /1 a Password 
Protected 'Locked Box · or a Simple Container?. NAT' L L.J .. May 15. 2007. available at 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id= ll79092588804. 
" Jd. 
12Andrus, 483 F.3d at 713- 14. 
13/d. at 723. Judge McKay took issue with the holding that "law enforcement may use 
software deliberately designed to automatically bypass computer password protection based 
on third-pa1ty consent without the need to make a reasonable inquiry regarding the presence of 
password protection and the third party's access to that password." !d. at 722. 
14 tf a third party does not have a key to a locked item. police cannot reasonably rely on 
third-party consent. See. e.g .. United States v. Block. 590 F.2d 535, 537 (4th Cir. 1978) 
(holding that although a mother had the authority to allow a search of her house, she did not 
have such authority over her son's foot locker when she had no key to open it and it was 
'·fastened shut by some means that indicatc;:d to the otlicers that it was locked and that a key 
was required to open it" ). 
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looks at the reasonable expectation of privacy test15 adopted by the Supreme Court 
and how it has been applied to certain types of technology. Part V analyzes the 
application of third-party consent to locked containers and to computers in general. 
Part VI dissects the application of these principles in the only three cases16 to 
specifically deal with passwords as locks when a third-party has consented to a 
warrantless search of a computer. Finally, Part VII offers a reasonable, common-
sense approach to password-protected computers based on a foundation of principles 
hammered out over time for other locked containers. 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AS A FOUNDATION FOR PRIVACY 
During the drafting of the Constitution, a man from Virginia by the name of 
George Mason called for a Bill of Rights to be included. 17 He and others like him 
believed that the primary purpose of government was to protect peoples' rights.'8 
These included the freedoms of speech and religion,19 the right to bear arms,20 and 
the right to be secure from unlawful searches and seizures.21 While the Bill of Rights 
was ratified in 1791 ,22 it would be fifteen years before a case involving search and 
seizure would come before the Supreme Court.23 Nevertheless, it was abundantly 
clear from the framers of the amendment that it is the right of all American citizens 
" to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures."24 
A. The Fourth Amendment 
The principles of the rights guaranteed in the Fourth Amendment predate the 
Constitution itself. In colonial America, British officers would make sweeping 
searches of homes and businesses using general writs of assistance to ensure no 
15See infra Part !I.A. 
16See infra Part VI. 
17CHARLES M. WETTERER, THE fOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE 18 ( 1998). 
18ld. While George Mason wanted the Bill of Rights included into the Constitution, 
another delegate, Roger Sherman, spoke out against it. !d. at 18-19. Explaining that the many 
state constitutions already provided for certain rights, he was able to convince enough others 
to vote against it. /d. at 18. When the Constitution was completed, Mason refused to sign it 
because it did not contain a Bill of Rights. !d. at 19. 
19U.S. CONST. amend. r. 
20U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
2 1U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
22WETTERER, supra note 17, at 22. 
23/d. at 24. In 1806, a merchant by the name of John Buford provoked his customers to 
such an extent that they complained to fourteen justices of the peace. !d. The justices issued a 
warrant for his arrest on the grounds that he was not of a good name and that horrible 
grievances such as murder could arise. Jd. at 24-25. When Buford could not post a bond of 
$4,000 to assure his good behavior, he was jailed. !d. at 25. The Supreme Court ordered him 
released because the warrant stated no offense. !d. 
24U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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goods were being smuggled in from countries other than England?5 These general 
writs of assistance could be used repeatedly and required no oath or level of 
specificity of what was to be searched. 26 One of the more well-espoused cases from 
England, Entick v. Carrington,Z7 involved state officers using general warrants to 
raid homes searching for materials that attacked the government and the King. 
Entick sued because the officers had gone through all of his personal belongings, 
drawers, and papers, including locked desks and boxes. 28 The court stated that to 
make such a practice legal "would be subversive of all the comforts of society."29 
The court also declared that probable cause and specificity of what was to be 
searched or seized is required in the issuing of a warrant. 30 
Although people in England enjoyed a higher level of privacy/' no protection 
from these writs existed for colonial America until the British were overtbrown.32 
John Adams said, on the eve of the American Revolution, "an Englishmen's 
dwelling House is his Castle. The law has erected a Fortification around it.'m The 
language of the Fourth Amendment encapsulates the mantra that "a person's home is 
his castle. "34 This fundamental principle can only be superseded by law enforcement 
when they have reason to believe a crime has taken place and the search they wish to 
conduct is narrowly tailored to find the specified evidence.35 In a factual situation 
giving rise to a Fourth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court has stated that the 
"capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends not upon a property 
right in the invaded place but upon whether the area was one in which there was a 
25MICHAEL ROGERS RUBIN, PRIVATE RIGHTS, PUBLIC WRONGS: THE COMPUTER AND 
PERSONAL PRIVACY 9 ( 1988). 
26/d. 
27Entick v. Carrington. ( 1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.). 
28Jd. 
~9/d. at 817. 
30ld. at 812. The court stated that when issuing a warrant for stolen goods, that "it is never 
granted, but upon the strongest evidence that a felony has been committed, and that the goods 
are secreted in such a house; and it is to seize such goods as were stolen, not all the goods in 
the house." Id 
31William Pitt, an eighteenth century British statesman perhaps said it best when in a 
speech before Parliament he declared: 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may 
be frail, its roof may shake, the wind may blow through it, the storm may enter, the 
rain may enter, but the King of England cannot enter! All his force dares not cross the 
threshold of the ruined tenement! 
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 n. l ( 1982) (quoting William Pitt). 
32RUBIN, supra note 25. at l 0. 
33HARRY HENDERSON, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 14 (1999). 
34See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
l!HENDERSON, supra note 33, at 15. 
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reasonable expectation of freedom from governmental intrusi.on.".l6 The modern 
standard by which courts consider whether a search has occurred is a two-pronged 
test from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States!7 ln making 
that determination, an analysis looks at whether (I) a person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy, and (2) "the expectation [is] one that society is prepared to 
recognize as reasonable."38 
B. The Third-Party Consent Exception and Apparent Authority 
Courts have devised exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement 
over the course of history. 39 One well-recognized exception occurs when a party 
gives law enforcement consent to conduct a warrantless search.40 Most relevant to 
this discussion of the consent exception is when a third party, who is not the primary 
target of the search, grants that consent. Generally, when a person has some interest 
in the property in question, that person may grant consent to a search that is in fact 
directed at a different person.41 Although the Supreme Court has held third-party 
consent searches valid,42 the guidelines courts use to navigate through this type of 
consent are "vague and generat.'><~3 
36Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 ( 1968). In fact, a year earlier, in Warden v. 
Hayden, the Court said: 
The premise that property interests control the right of the Government to search and 
seize has been discredited. Searches and seizures may be 'unreasonable' within the 
Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior property interest at 
common law. We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment 
is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded 
fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts. 
387 U.S. 294, 304 {1967). One Justice rationalized that property interest is not the proper 
analysis, and concluded that if it were. ''then much of our daily lives will be unshielded from 
unreasonable governmental prying, and the reach of the Fourth Amendment will have been 
narrowed to protect chiefly those with possessory interests in real or personal property." 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 166 ( 197R) (White, J., dissenting) . 
.'7389 u.s. 347 (1967). 
·'~td. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan explained his analysis of the two prong 
test, 
!d. 
[t]hus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, hut 
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 
'protected' because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On the 
other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard, 
for the expectation of privacy under the circumstances would be unreasonable. 
39See, e.g., sources cited supra note 7. 
40 18 AM. JUR. 2o Proof of Facts§ 681 (2008). 
41John B. Wcfing & John G. Miles. Jr. , Consent Searches and the Fourth Amendment: 
Voluntariness and Third Party Problems, 5 SETON HALL L. R.Ev. 21 1, 21 1-12 ( 1973). 
42See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974). 
43 18 AM. JUR. 2o Proof of Facts§ 681 (2008). 
+~!d. Early cases used an "agency approach'' that took into account an implied agency 
relationship between the person who consented and the suspect of the search. !d. This theory 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/8
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Several theories have evolved over time to help understand the val idity of third-
party consent to searches.44 The theory that has gained large acceptance in third-
party warrantless consents is the "possession and control" rule!5 This theory focuses 
on the third party's independent right to consent to the search and takes into account 
the third party's relationship to the property that is being searched.46 The 
prosecution "may show that permission to search was obtained from a third party 
who possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the 
premises or effects sought to be inspected."47 A variation of the possession and 
control test, the "apparent authority" test, looks at the apparent authority of the 
consenter to give that consent.48 Here, the consent is held valid when law 
enforcement reasonably believes that the consenter had authority over the place or 
object in question.49 However, the Supreme Court has made it clear that ''the rights 
protected by the Fourth Amendmellt are not to be eroded by strained applications of 
the law ... or by unrealistic doctrines of 'apparent authority. "'50 
Courts have thus needed to decide at what point common authority is had over a 
given premjses or property so that the third party has the right to consent to the 
search. Generally, if a consenter has equal or superior rights of use and access, then 
that third party can grant consent.51 However, inferior rights of a third-party 
consenter cannot give rise to a valid consent. 52 A cornucopia of factors are used to 
determine common authority over property, including monetary relationships, 
familial relationships, actual possession, and de facto control.53 The Supreme Court 
has held that the law of property does not apply when determining the justification of 
held that the third party was an agent of the suspect and thus had the ability to consent to the 
search. Jd. A second approach is called the ·'status relationship" approach. which looks at the 
consenter's mere relationship to the suspect (e.g. husband/wife) to detennine if the consent is 




47 Matlock, 415 U.S. at 17 1. 
48 18 AM. J UR. 2D Proof of Facts§ 681 (2008). 
491d. 
50Stoncr v. California. 376 U.S. 483,488 (1964). The Court went on to explain: 
[I)t is unnecessary and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the constitutional 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions. developed 
and refmed by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which, 
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose 
validity is largely historical. We ought not to bow to them in the fair administration of 
the criminal law. To do so would not comport with our justly proud claim of the 
procedural protections accorded to those charged with crime. 
51Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006). 
52 18 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts§ 681 (2008). 
53Wefing & Miles. supra note 41. at 262. 
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third-party con~t:nt.'~ Rather. the authority rests on " mutual use of the property by 
II I · · · I r ,s~ persons genera y 1av1ng JOint al'l't'!'S or t:ontro tOr most purposes. · · 
When the apparent authority doctrine is used. the sean:hing officer's reasonable 
belief of the third-party consentt·r·s authority is taken into account.56 Under the 
apparent authority doctrine, a third party can consent to a search if a police officer 
reaSl)llably, but erroneously. bdi~vcs that the third party has the actual authority to 
consent.;; The o~jcctive inquiry looks at whether the facts avai lable to the officer at 
the moment allow a reasonable p~rson to believe that the third party had authority 
over the premises.5x However. if an officer is l~lt:cd v.:ith an ambiguous situation 
with respect to the authority of a third party to consent, he cannot disregard that 
ambiguity.59 Rather, he has a duty t0 ask questions and make a further investigation 
prior to relying on the consent. 6 '1 
Ill. COMPUTF.R CONCEPTS AND SOFTWARI-. FOR ENSIC BASIC'S 
There can be no doubt that t~chno logy plays a pivotal role in the daily lives of 
people every\odH!rc. Even b:H.:k in l <JX2 . Time magazine changed its annual "Man of 
the Year .. to "Machine or the Year.• ><•l A writer of that issue commented, "computers 
were once regarded as distant. ominous abstra t: tions, like Big Brother. In 1982, they 
truly became personalized. brought down to scale, so that people could hold, prod 
and play with them."<·~ Sint:e then. computer c rime has also caught on. ll has 
become so prevalent, that the Department l) f Justice maintains a website specifically 
lor reporting on computt:r crimes.~• Whi le such crimes are what eventually lead us 
to a discussion on wurrantlcss :;carche~ of computers based on third-party consent, it 
.. See soun.:es cited supru. note 36. 
5; J'vfut/ock, 4 15 U.S. at 172 n.7. 
5<> 1x AM. JI:R. 21l l'mr~(t{Fucll' ~ 6X I (2008). 
~7 lllin\liS "·Rodriguez. 497 !J.S. 177. ll\u ( 1990). 
~~United States v. Kimoana, 383 F.3d 1215, 1222 (lOth Cir. 2004). The court in this case 
further went on to expi<tin that "th..: burden l of pro\ i ng e!Tectiveness of consent] cannot be met 
if agems. faced with an amhig.u1H1S situation. nevertheless proceed without making further 
inquiry." Ill Furthermore. "Jw1arrantlcss entry is unlawfu l without fur1her inquiry if 
circumstances make it um:lear whether the propc11y about to be searched is subject to mutual 
use by the person giving consl·nt." !d. 
~·) fcl. 
I>\' I d. 
t>
1Computer History Must:um. hnp://w'A wxomputerhistory.org/timeline/?category=-ppc 
(last visited Mar. 19. 2009). Interestingly enough, the main writer wrote his article on a 




3Unitcd States Dcparnncnt or Justice: Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, 
hllp :/iwww.cybcrcrimc.g~w/c..:ips . hlml tlast visited Mar. 19. 2009). This depanment of the 
government is responsibk li1r implcm<::nring strategic~ to combat computer and intellectual 
property crimes. Iii. The department .. pre,·ents. investigates. and prosecutes computer crimes 
hy working with other gowmment ug.:ncit:s, the private scctl1r, academic institutions, and 
foreign coun terp<~ns:· /d. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/8
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is helpful to understand SOme fundamentals Of hO\\ l:(llllj>lltCr~ and f(lrcnsil: :.0fi11 ar\! 
operate. 
A. Hard Drin•s <mel Operating .\n/('111' 
Several articles discussing scnrchcs and ~cttur\!-.. h:l\ c gone into great depth:-. tll1 
the technological aspects of h011 data i-; -.tored on t.·omputer hard dm c-.. IH1\\ rh.: 
technology works when individuals <.~ct:c!l!> daw on a h:rrd uri1 c. and btl\\ t(lrt'tl'-.ir 
sofhvare interacts with tiles on hard uri I c::..''J \\ hik a tkt:tiktl lll1tkr-..t<llldin~ is not 
necessary for this Note. a brief 0\Cn ic11 111' the tcchthll<'!:!) 11 ill hl'lp pr~' idc u 
foundation for understanding the conflict courts H1ce in vit.'l\ tng compu ters :~:-. a 
physical box or a virtual one for purpose~ nf scar\·hcs and sci;urcs. 
When law cn lorccmetH searches a complth.:r rnr el idclllX. the pntn:ll') loc;tlion or 
data storage being searched i~ th~.: hard dri1 c.'.< 1\ hard dri1 c '' ithin a computer i~ 
made up of mnny intt:rconnccted tllcchanic:d :tnd clcctril·:tl parts ~~:tkd in :1 
containcr.116 The main rari ins id~ that (;Oillaincr i:-. a ~cri~.·:- (I I l'l)lltld di'>t'S, ()!' pl:t ll~'t''>. 
stacked on top or one another_,.- Daw is :-.lort·d on the ~llllitcc ol' <.:ad1 plaucr.'·' bd1 
MSee general~r Ty E. lloward. /)un 1 Cadw 0111 ) our Cm,· · l'mwcrtting Cllil./ 
Pornoxraphy Pm~cs.1ion Lmr:s Based on lnwgn l.ul'alt·d 111 11'1/lfi•Wcn..- 1111<'1'11<'1 File'. I <J 
BERKFI.FY TH H. L.J. 1227 (200-1) ( tlist:us~ing data 1111 a hard dl'll ..:. -p..:..:i !i<'<lll) "ith n:~p..:cl to 
Internet bro" sing): LIO)'d S. \':til O(I!Hernrij!... Con11n.:nl. /'•'!'•'~' ,,. l'f,Nic '. /:lee IIWII<' 
Di~ccJI'ery and ::,;mliatinn in the D1xitul . lge. -I:! I lot" I Rr 1 . IH1> t::!OO:;I (di\nts,lllg lam 
data gets stored and ~rased 1111 a hard dri1.:1: \\a~ Ill' Jd.•ll. C 'mnt>lll<'f' /·m·,·n.'w'. S, •, wrli 
Strategie.\, and the Purticuiaritl' Reqnir.!lll<'lll. 7 l Ptt 1 • .I It t 11. I & 1'111 ·y 2 1.2007) 
(discussing t.:Omput.:r fMensics). 
1
''Hnrd Disk Hom.:. Imp:''""" hardth~l..hum.:xom 1 l.ht 1 i,ill'd \1.1r. I 9. ~009 ). 
pccifkally, 
hi. 
filn any computerS) stem the hard t11~k 1" t:tHNdc1.:d a' the ~ei:<'IHiar~ m.:lll<lr:- de' it:.: 
that is used f(lr the primary data ~toragc. Th..: primat') mcnwr~ j, oh1 iou,l: rh.: 1<:\M. 
Bur as the RAM is thl' primary m.:mo~ it t'annnt he lt,.:d 1;1r th.: purpow ,)r tl~<· 
permanent data storage. Hence a sco:ondar) mcmcJr) dl'\ tlX ;, 11eel·ssarily needed li1r 
the purpo~c of the data storage in an~ .:omprut:r s~· ~h:m. \p:tn !'rom hard di~k dri' c 
the tape storage media can also he used a~ th.: ..,ct:ondar) , tpr;~gc devi~o:l'. Hut the h:1rd 
disk drive i~ the lllOSt popufurfy used Sl't'lltHia ry IIICIIHJr) de1 icc. I he 111:1111 r.·a~nn f<ll' 
this is the access speed and tiH: rdiahility nf the data 11 can ,, l.l'i.!a. In the <'<N' or the 
tape drives the access speed is much lower and th l.! data trans t'cr i~ comparamdv lo11 
than the hard disk drive. 
Mpc Guide: liard Disk Op.:rational Chcl'\ ic" . hup: 1111" .pq;uidc.com rclihdd/,1p · 
ovcr.htm ( last visited Mar. 19. 2009). Round. tlar dt~l.:~ l..tHIII n a~ rl:utcr-. th<tt arc ,·oared" ith 
a special material to store data in the l~1rm t'i' magndic rau.:mo;. 1.1. I hc~c platters arc th.:n 
stacked on top of one another on a spindle ld ,\ n1111or ~rm~ the pla11cr:, :n :1 't't) high 
speed. /d. Devi~:e:-. that are able to read th~.: maglll'lic palter!< . ..::riled h~.:ads. ntl! mtHmtnl nntn 
sliders and usc electromagnetic charg.:s to t!ither read data from tho: di~k nr record inlimnmion 
to it. /d. The sliders are anach.:d to arm\ and arc ~:onnectctl and p<l>;ttinncd m cr the ~urfac..: or 
the disk. /d. A de' icc known as a logi.: board 11od,, "ith th..: rl·~t 111' thl· cumpull'l' <~nd help' 
to control the compont!nts. /d. 
b'pc Guide: Hard Di~k Plaucrs and 1\kdia. hllp: """ .pqwid..:.nnn r.:rl1dd op 
rnedia.htm (last visited Feb. I 0. 2008). Speciti~:all). 
[e)very hard disk contains one or mon: llm di~b that an: ll!<l'd I\> :Klltally hnld tho: data 
in the drive. Th.:se disks arc .:<~lied p lallcr~ . . The~ arc .:om posed nl '" o main 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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platter contains concentric circles called tracks and each concentric circle is further 
divided into smaller sections called sectors.69 While data is stored on these sectors, 
they are too small for modern operating systems, such as Microsoft Windows, to 
work with.70 The operating system groups these sectors together into units called 
clusters.71 It is then the operating systems job to manage the data.72 
The operating system is the computer' s master control program.73 lts job is to act 
as the interface between the hardware and the individual, including the software the 
individual uses.74 The operating system provides a user interface,75 job 
management,76 task management,71 device management,78 data management/9 and 
security.80 In terms of data management, the operating system keeps track of where 
data is physically stored on each sector of a hard drive.81 Whenever an individual 
wishes to save or delete data from the hard drive, he or she must instruct the 
operating system to interact with the bard drive to complete the request.82 
/d. 
substances: a subs/rate material that forms the bulk of the platter and gives it structure 
and rigidity, and a magnelic media coaling which actually holds the magnetic 
impulses that represent the data. Hard d isks get their name from the rigidity of the 
platters used, as compared to floppy disks and other media which use flexible 
.. platters ." 
(j~!d. 
69Marshall Brain, How Hard Disks Work. http://computer.howstuffworks.com/hard-
disk7 .htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). 
70 Hard Drive C lusters and File Allocation, http://www.dewassoc.com/kbase/hard drives/ 
clusters.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2009). -
1 1See Brain, supra note 69. 
71T ec hEncycloped ia, http://www. techweb. com/encyclopedialdefi neterm.jhtm l'?term=:O p 




' A user interface includes the graphical menus and windows that help the computer user 
and the computer interact. /d. 
76Job management refers to the scheduling of the order in which programs are run. /d. 
77Task management is the ability to perform more than one task at a time- multitasking. 
!d. 
78Devicc management involves tbe controlling of all other hardware associated with the 
machine and sending that hardware commands to work for the user. /d. 
NData management is the process of keeping track of where data is stored, whether on a 
hard drive, an optical disk, or tape. or any other type of media. /d. 
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One of the major features of the security aspect of an operating system is that of 
password protection. Password protection is designed to specifically keep 
unauthorized users from accessing data.s3 It allows a single user of a computer to 
keep others out and allows multiple users of a single machine to have their own 
secure accounts.)~.~ While there are several types of operating systems available 
today, including MacOS and Linux. over eighty-eight percent of computers run the 
Microsoft Windows operating system.~' Windows XP and Windows Vista allow for 
separate user accounts and passwords. known as profiles.~~ Each user is able to set 
personal preferences, and the operating system blocks each user from accessing 
another user's profile and data.87 Password-protected user accounts allow for an 
expectation of privacy that others without the password will not gain access to 
private information. It is through this aspect of a computer where the issue arises 
whether to treat a computer as a "locked box" that protects the virtua l contents, as 
opposed to a physical box lor open view ing.~8 
B. Forensic Sojiware 
Password protection is also relevant for purposes of forens ic analysis of hard 
drives. Forensic analysis of hard drives has the ability to bypass passwords 
completely, thus making passwords irrelevant.~9 In a nutshe ll. "computer forensics is 
the analysis of information contained within and created with computer systems and 
computing devices, typically in the interest of figuring out what happened, when it 
happened, how it happened, and who was involved. ""0 One of the more widely used 
83Strong Passwords: How to Create and Use Them, http://www.microsoti.com/protcct/ 
yourself/password/create.mspx (last visited Mar. 19. 2009). 
R4Windows Vista llelp: Whm is a User Account. http://windowshelp.microsoft.com/ 
Windows/en-US/H..:lp/5d82b9b6-0a55-4 I 99-b5d I -5b25b6b 1 06cb 1 O::n.mspx (last visited Mar. 
12, 2009). 
850perating System Market Share, http://marketshare.hitslink.com/rcport.aspx?qprid=g 
(last visited Mar. 4. 2009). Coming in second place is the Macintosh operating system at 
approximately ten percent and the Linux operating system is third at under one percem. !d. 
R6User Account Control Overview. http://technel.microsoft.com/en-us/windowsvista/ 
aa90602J.aspx (last visited Feb. 10. 2008). 
87Create and Customize User Accounts. hnp://wv.-w.microsof'l.com/windowsxpiusingl 
setup/winxp/accounts.mspx (last vis ited Mar. 4. 2009). 
88MacLean, supra note 10. 
SQSteve Thompson. How Computer Forensic lnn:srigarors (CF/s) Recover £1·idence. 
ASSOCIA TEn CONTENT, Jan. 4. 2008. amilahle at http://www .associaledcontent.com/article 
/487 557 /how_ computer _forensic_ i nvcstigators.html. 
90Steve Hailey, What is Cumpwer Forensic~-:'. http:l/www.cybersecurityinstitute.biz/ 
forensics.htm (Sept. 19. 2003). Computer forensics can be used to analyze and detennine the 
root cause of a system failure or why a system is not operating in the manner lor whid1 it is 
designed. /d. In addition, computer forensics can be used to tlgurc out who has been 
misusing a computer system and to what extent that misuse has occurred. hi. Computer 
forensics helps law enforcement determine if a crime has been committed on a computer or 
against a computer system. IJ. Also. ·'[i]n many cases, infonnation is gathered during a 
computer forensics investigation that is not typically available or viewable by the average 
11Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
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forensic software tools is EnCase by Guidance Soflware.9 1 Forensic software such as 
this allows law enforcement to make an identical copy of a hard drive without regard 
to the presence of any operating system on the hard drive.92 The forensic software 
creates a "bitstream" copy of the hard drive that includes all sectors, whether they 
have data on them or not.93 In addition, this includes data that may have been 
previously deleted by an individual.94 This is because when an individual " deletes" 
data from a hard drive, the operating system only marks the sectors as empty so that 
they can be written to again.q5 However, the original data is sti ll there until the user 
"saves" another file onto that sector.% Even though the data may appear gone to the 
operating system, forensic software allows law enforcement to retrieve that data.97 
Because the forensic investigator is not turning on the computer in the norn1al sense, 
there is no operating system and are no passwords with which to be bothered. 
Investigators work with hard drives on a physical level where every file is capable of 
being searched and opened. In this scenario, operating system features, such as 
password protection, are not a concern. It is through this very fundamental makeup 
of a computer where the issue arises whet.her to treat a computer as a physical box or 
as a " locked box" that protects the virtual contents.98 
IV. SEARCHING, SEIZING, AND TECHNOLOGY 
While the Fourth Amendment may have originally been intended to be very 
specific. applying only to intrusions by the federal government,99 its scope has been 
computer user. such as deleted Iiles and tragments of data that can be found in the space 
al located for existing files." !d. 
'"Guidance Software. http://www.guidancesoftware.com (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
92How EnCase Forensics Works, http://ww\\ .guicl:lllcesoftware.com/products/ef_ 
works.aspx (last visited Mar. 4. 2009). 
9
·
1Basics of Computer Forensics, http://www.cyberconlrols.net/torensics/attomcytorensic 
basics.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). A bitstream copy is: 
/d. 
'"the technical term for the end-product of a forensics acquisition of a computer's hard 
drive. . . The bit-stream copy involves the copying of every bit of data on an 
'evidence' hard drive, which includes the lile slack, and unal located fil e space in 
which ' deleted' files and e-mails are frequently recovered from." 
"
4 fd. To explain, ''a .. . common assumption by computer users when ... delet[ing] a 
document .. . on . . . [a) computer is that that tile is forever gone. This could not be further 
from the tn1th. In fact, the deleted lile has been re-assigned to the slack space of the hard 
drive:· !d. FU11hermore, while a computer user cannot see the deleted file, "a bit-stream copy 
and subsequent examination of the slack space wil l likely reveal the contents of lhe entire 
document." !d. 




17Hailey, supra note 90. 
9RMacLean, supra note I 0. 
99Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 ( 1949). 
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/8
2009] DANGEROUSLY SIDESTEPPING THE FOURT/1 AMt:ND.WENT 291 
greatly extended since its ratification.100 Societal changes and populatton increast!s 
resulted in a higher number of govemment searchcs}01 Go\cmmc::nt searches were 
most prevalent tor a long time in investigations of violation~ of liquor prohibition 
laws and sales and use of drugs. 10~ However, advancements in technology led to 
more questions on the use of government searches.w1 Telephone communications. 
professional cameras, aerial surveillance. the Internet, and computer records all add 
on to the complexities of analyzing suspected governmental violations or the Fourth 
Amendment. 104 When Supreme Court members change. often the interpretation of 
the Fourth Amendment does as well. 10~ What constitute~ a legal search still remains 
unclear to many people up to this day--even judges.'!)() 
A. The Rule for Expectations ofPrivac..:l' 
As of 2003, a lmost sixty-two percent of all U.S. households bad a computer}117 
In addition to changing the way people go about their dai ly business. computers have 
also changed how crimes are committed}08 It hns become necessary lor courts 10 
examine how the Fourth Amendment applies to law enforcement's searches and 
seizures of computer data. While this Note looks at warrantless searches and 
seizures, a completely diflerent analysis has been conducted un what types of data 
law enforcement officers can search for on a computer once they have a warrant and 
are sifting through the contents of a computer hard drive.' 11" These include questions 
about what law enforcement should be restricted to when search ing a hard drive, 
whether it be by file names, file types, or certain keywords. 110 Whether new 
100WEn ERER, supra note 17. at 89. 




lOS /d. at 91. 
106/d. The Supreme Court has issued around 400 opmtons that involvt: the Founh 
Amendment, a great many of which have been by five-to-four decisions. /c/. 
107Households with Computers. 1998 and 2003, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa! 
A093144l.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2009). 
10tiDavid. J. S. ZifT. Fourlh Amendmem Umilations 011 the Execution of CompufC'r 
Searches Conducted Pursuam 1o a Worrall/, 105 Cot UM. L. REv. !:!4 1. 841 (2005). 
1 ~/d. at 845-52. In one case. after lawfully seizing a comput..:r, the o!licers obtained a 
warrant to search the computer for '"names, telephone numbers. ledger receipts. addrcs!>es. and 
other documentary evidence pertaining to the sale and distribution of controlled substances ... 
!d. at 846. The detective. after browsing through the files, came across tmagcs of child 
pornography. This posed a problem for the coun as to what e' idence should be allo"Wed. The 
court ultimately allowed in all the evidence concerning controlled substances. up to and 
including the first child pornography picture opened. /d. at !:!48. However. the court 
suppressed all pictures opened afterwards as not being pan of the warrant's requirements. /d. 
110<yhomas K. Clancy. The Fourth Amendment Aspects of Compwer Searches and 
Sei:ures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J. 193, 205-10 (2005). One argume!nt stat<!S 
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technology is seen as a means of endless possibilities or as being out of control with 
negative effects on identity and privacy, its integration into daily life is met with 
tense regulat ion .' 11 
Computers are not the first technological advancements that have caused 
problems for the courts. In 1928 in Olmsted v. United States, 112 the Supreme Court 
held that the tapping of a person's phone line from outside his or her house was 
acceptable. 113 The Court stated that protection from the Fourth Amendment came 
only through protection from physical intrusions. 114 This resulted in Presidents 
g iving the FBI expanded authority to wiretap and increased the usage of electronic 
surveillance.' 15 It was not until 1967 in Katz v. United Stares116 that the Court wou ld 
overturn the requirement of physical intrusion and declare that "what a person 
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an 
area accessible to the publ ic, may be constitutionally protected." 117 
Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz brought forth the "reasonable expectation of 
privacy'' test, the test employed today in determining whether Fourth Amendment 
protections have been violated .' 18 This is a two-pronged test that looks at whether 
(I) a person has a subjective expectation of privacy, and (2) " the expectation [is] one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."119 Due to privacy concerns that 
stem from the use of computers, Fourth Amendment analysis in terms of the 
that law enforcement should not be restrained by certain file types, such as ".jpg" for a picture. 
!d at 207-08. The reasoning is that most people who want to hide something will 
'·intentionally mislabel tiles, or al\empt to bury incriminating files within innocuously named 
directories.'' /d. at 209 (quoting United States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524 (E.D. Va. 1999)). 
Therefore, law enforcement need not "accept as accurate any fi le name or suffix and limit 
[the] search accordingly." /d. 
11 1H ENDERSON, supra note 33 , at 13. Henderson opines, "How do people decide how to 
respond to the challenge of a technology that is as ripe with unforeseeable consequence as the 
invention of writing itself?' ' /d. He states that one way is through regulation, and that "the 
telephone, the automobile, TV- all have been imegrated into society through a combination of 
regulation and social custom." Id. 
112277 U.S. 438, 466 ( 1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, and Berger 
v. New York. 388 U.S. 41. 
113Jd. 
11 4Jd. 
115Daniel J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age 
199 (2004). 
116389 u.s. 347 ( 1967). 
117/d. at 35 1 (citations omitted). 
118
SOLOVE, supra note I 15, at 198. Solove notes that change over time "brings into 
existence new conditions and purposes. Subtler and more far-reach ing means of invading 
privacy have become available to the government." /d. (quoting Olmstead v. United States. 
277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis. J., dissenting)). Thanks to technological changes, it is 
"possihle for the government, by means far more effective than stretching on the rack. to 
obtain disclosure in the court of what is whispered in the closet." /d. 
119
SOLOVE. supra note 115, at 198 (quoting Ka1z, 380 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J. , concurring)). 
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/8
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searching and seizing of computers and the data contained on them ·'must be 
approached cautiously and narrowly."120 
B. Applying the Rule to Technology 
After the Supreme Court announced the reasonable expectation of privacy test in 
Katz, the Court had the opportunity to address the reasonableness of certain 
technologies in searches, including aerial surveillance and thermal imaging. In 
Florida v. Riley,121 the defendant had a partially covered greenhouse in his 
backyard. 122 A police officer observed the interior of that greenhouse while circling 
400 feet above in a helicopter. 123 While the defendant met the first prong of the test 
by taking precautions to prevent observation from the ground, 124 the Court held that 
he could not reasonably expect privacy from a he licopter flying above the 
greenhouse because the helicopter was flying within the bounds of the law}2~ In 
Kyllo v. United States, 126 law enforcement aimed a thermal imaging device at a home 
from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home. m The Court 
held that a search has occurred when the ''Government uses a device that is not in 
genera l public use. to explore the details of the home that would previously have 
120People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 165 (Colo. 2001) (Martine7. J.. dissenting). This must be 
done ·'because of the important privacy concerns inherent in the nature of computers, and 
because the technology in this area is rapidly growing and changing." /d. 
121488 u.s. 445 (1989). 
122/d. at 448. 
12) /d. 
12~/d. at450. The Court recognized that "[t]wo sides of the greenhouse were enclosed. The 
other two sides were ... obscured from view .. .. The greenhouse was covered by corrugated 
roofing panels .. . land a] wire fence surrounded the mobile home and 1he greenhouse, and the 
property was posted with a ' DO NOT ENTER' sign." Jd. at448. 
125/d. at 450-52. The Court took careful notice to indicate that not all aircraft activity by 
law enforcement could be lawful, and that flying a few feet below legal airspace or kicking up 
some dust might be enough for a different analysis: 
!d. 
This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an aircraft will 
always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is within 
the navigable airspace specified by law. But it is of obvious importance that the 
helicopter in this case was not violating the law, and there is nothing in the record or 
before us to suggest that helicopters flying at 400 feet are sufficiently rare in this 
country to lend substance to respondent's claim that he reasonably anticipated that his 
greenhouse would not be subject to observation from that altitude. Neither is there 
any intimation here that the helicopter interfered with respondent's normal use of the 
greenhouse or of other parts of the curtilage. As far as this record reveals, no intimate 
details connected with the use of the home or curtilage were observed. and there was 
no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury. 
126533 u.s. 27 (2001). 
121/d. at 29-30. 
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been unknowable without physical intrusion ... and is presumptively unreasonable 
without a warrant."12s 
In many cases. such as Andrus. law enforcement use forensic devices and 
software to access data on a computer's hard drive.129 These forensic tools allow law 
enforcement to ignore the existence of password locks and to search through data on 
a hard drive. 130 While the use of this technology may be appropriate in certain 
situations, such as when a legal warrant has been obtained, its use on password-
protected computers when authorized by third parties presents troubling results from 
a Fourth Amendment privacy perspective.u1 
V. ANALYZING WARRANTLESS THIRD- PARTY CONSENT SEARCHES 
The vast majority of computer searches take place under the auspices of a 
warrant.m As such, dealing with warrantless third-party consents to password-
protected computer searches has not been an easy task for appellate courts to deal 
with.m In fact, only three circuit courts have touched on this specific situation.'34 
Before discussing those three cases. however, an analysis of what courts have held to 
be the standard for searching locked containers,135 as well as what the courts have 
done with computers in general, is necessary. 
A. When There Is No Key to a Locked Container, There Is No Third-Party Consent 
Even when police have been given consent to search an area by a third party 
under the rubric of apparent authority. that consent has been held to not apply to 
locked or otherwise protected areas where the party giving authority does not have 
the "key" to the locked area. 131' This principle has tested true time and time again. 137 
12~ !d. at 40. 
129United States v. Andrus. 483 F .3d 711 , 713-14 (I Oth Cir. 2007). 
130 /d. 
131id. at 723 (McKay, J.. dissenting) (explaining that "[t]he fact r<!mains that [forensic 
software's] ability to bypass security measures is well known to law enforcement). 
1.12/d. at 722 n.l. 
133See MacLean, supra note 10. 
134ld. 
1351t has been long established that .. [c]ontainers are a well-defined category within Fourth 
Amendment law." Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. Rf.v. 
531 , 550 (2005). In fact, "[t]he foundational premise of the container cases is that opening a 
container constitutes a search of its contents; if a person has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of a container, opening the container and seeing the contents violates 
that reasonable expectation of privacy." !d. 
136See. e.g., United States v. Bell, 357 F. Supp. 2d I 065 (N.D. Ill. 2005); State v. Harris, 
642 A.2d 1242 (Del. I993); People v. Snipe, 841 N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). 
137To name just a few cases illustrative of this, in State v. Harris, 642 A.2d 1242 (Del. 
1993), the court found that a mother could consent to a search of her son ·s room, but not a 
locked toolbox. !d. at 124R. Furthennore, it was unreasonable for the police to assume 
authority when they knew it was locked, and the mother did not have the key. Jd. at 1248-49. 
In State v. Smith, 966 S.W.2d I (Mo. Ct. App. 1997), the court held the defendant's girlfriend 
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss2/8
2009) DANGEROUSLY SIDESTEPPING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 295 
In United States v. 8/ock,13~ police: serving an arrest warrant were conducting a 
general search of a home. Mrs. Block, the homeowner, consented to the search of 
her 23-year-old son's room. 09 Inside the room, officers found a padlocked 
footlocker belonging to the son. 140 Mrs. Block did not possess a key to the 
footlocker. 141 The officers forced open the footlocker and found heroin. 1 4~ In 
determining that the authority to search the room did not extend to the locked 
footlocker, the court relied on the son's expectations of privacy.143 When a particular 
object is secured or is generally known for preserving privacy, it is unreasonable to 
confront such a secure container and force it open when the third party has no shared 
access to the container.144 The fact that the legal-aged son was a mere occupant of 
the home allows for a finding that he assumed the risk that his mother could allow a 
general search of the house and even his room. 14s However, that assumption of the 
risk does not expand, in such circumstances, to every discreet enclosed space.'46 
did not have apparent authority to consent to a search of a locked safe. /d. at 8. The officers 
pried open the safe with a hammer. crowbar, and screwdriver. !d. There was no evidence that 
the girlfriend had any interest in the safe or its contents. /d. at 8-9. In People v. Snipe. 841 
N.Y.S.2d 763 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007). the court held that a mother had no authority to consent to 
a search of a closet when the defendant placed a lock on it and did not provide a key to the 
mother. /d. at 770-772. 
JJ~590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). 
119/d. at 537. Police were serving an arrest warrant for an individual who was known to 
reside at Mrs. Block"s house. /d. The police and Mrs. Block provided differing vit:ws of how 
the consent "as given. !d. The police testified that prior to forcing opt:n the locked trunk, 
they obtained a signed consent form to search her son's room and take anything that could be 
used as evidence. !d. Mrs. Block claimed that she received the consent form only after the 
police opened the trunk and seized the items. /d. She claimed the police described the form to 
her as a receipt for the items that were seized. /d. 
140hl 3l 537. 
141/c/. 
u 2Jd. at 538. 
143/d. at 541. 
144Jd. at 541. In a footnote. the court chastised the police for acting in such a manner when 
it said, ··Here, all the circumstanct:s presented to the police indicated the wisdom. as well as 
the relative convenience of seeking a search warrant to inspect the footlocker's interior:· /d. 
at541 n.9. 
1 4~/d. at 54 I. 
116/d. at 541. The court acknowledged that ·•common experiencc[s] of life' · arc to be 
con~idcrcd in "assessing the e.\istencc and the reasonableness of privacy expectations.'' !d. 
Furthermore. ·'it surely teaches all of us that the law's ·enclosed spaces· mankind 's valises. 
suitcases, footlockers. strong boxes, etc. arc frequentl y the objects of his highest privacy 
expectations·· and that expectations of privacy are "at their most intense ... when such effectS 
arc kept semi-permanently in public places or in places under the general control of another." 
!d. 
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This principle of protection is essential to the "primary objects of people 's ordinary 
expectations of privacy ."147 
The particular item to be searched need not even be secured with a lock in the 
typical sense. 1t is enough that the item in question is one that is personal to 
someone and is not mutually used by the third person g iving consent. In Marganet v. 
State;48 the defendant's girl friend consented to a search of their hotel room.149 The 
police ultimately found illegal drugs inside the defendant's shaving kit, which was 
located inside his suitcase.150 Acknowledging that the girlfriend retained actual 
authority over the hotel room, 151 the court held that she lacked authority to consent to 
the search of the shaving kit and the suitcase. 152 The court determined that the items 
searched were personal to the defendant, were closed and sitting up against a wall, 
and were inappropriately searched when the third party was unsure of the contents 
and gave no indication that she had permission to access them or mutually used 
them. 153 These facts could not lead officers to a reasonable belief of apparent 
authority over the items without further inquiry.154 Even in cases where the container 
is not locked, it is imperative that an officer take steps to obtain sufficient tacts on 
which to base a decision as to whether the third party has "common authority over 
the . . . property to be searched."155 
From these illustrative examples, the rules of third-party consent, and the 
limitations thereof, are well-solidified. When individuals live together, they assume 
the risk that one of the individuals may consent to searches of common areas of a 
home and shared objects. 156 When an object is locked and the third-party individual 
does not have a key to the lock, it is unreasonable for law enforcement to believe 
141ld. The court indicated that in cases like this it is hard to imagine how the 
"manifestations of retained expectations of privacy by the absent person could be stronger, or 
the indications of assumed risks of third person pem1ission to inspect, lower."' /d. 
148927 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2006). 
149ld. at 53. 
150/d 
151 !d. at 56. 
IS2Jd. at 61. 
153/d. The court explained, after reviewing a number of relevant cases, that a number of 
tactors come into play when determining the rights of a third party to consent to a search. /d. 
at 56-60. Factors included are "whether the property clearly belongs to one person, whether it 
is generally used by one person, whether it is freely accessible to others, whether the container 
is closed or open, whether it is locked or unlocked, and whether orders have been given not to 
open the container." Jd at 60. 
154/d. In drawing a distinction. the court said that "it is less reasonable for a police officer 
to believe that a third party has full access to a defendant's purse or a briefcase than. say, an 
open crate." /d. 
155 !d at 61. Possession of a container does not imply automatic authority to consent to a 
search. The court stated that ''[f)or purposes of searches of closed containers, mere possession 
of the container by a third party does not necessarily give rise to a reasonable belief that the 
third party has authority to consent to a search of its contents." Jd. at61. 
15
<>See sources cited supra, note 137. 
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there is shared access to the object. and they cannot rely on the third person ·s 
authority to grant consent to a search.157 Furthennore, when law enforcement is 
faced with an ambiguous situation as to whether the third party has authority to 
consent to a search. it is imperative that they take appropriate steps and ask 
appropriate questions to make a detenn.nation. 1$8 Willful blindness is not an option. 
B. Analyzing Warramless Searches of Computers 
These principles of an expectation of privacy have not been wholly lost when 
applied to data stored on computers in general. When individuals place data in files 
on the hard drive of their computers, they manifest a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the contents of those files. 159 In fact. a heightened expectation of privacy 
can be said to exist, at least when it comes to tiles that have been deleted. One court 
has held that deleted files are not analogous to trash put out on the treelawn. 160 
While there may be no expectation of privacy in the trash that one throws out,161 
when it comes to forensi(; recovery of deleted files under Fourth Amendment 
analysis, an individual does not abandon the right to privacy of computer files by 
virtue of deleting them.162 
Courts have also previously addressed the warrantless searching of a computer in 
a handful of factual scenarios that involve third-party consent and computers in 
general. An analysis of these cases helps to understand the state of affairs before 
addressing the main issue of password-protected computers and third-party consent. 
For instance, even when a computer hard drive is delivered to another person for 
repairs, the reasonable expectation of privacy of the data on the hard drive is not 
forgone. In United Stmes v. Barth.'61 the defendant provided his hard drive to a 
technician who was also an FBI confidential infonnant. 164 When the technician 
found c hild pornography, he was instructed to make a copy of the hard drive. 165 Law 
enforcement subsequently searched the hard drive.166 Likening the hard drive to a 
locked container, the court held the expectation of privacy was in the contents of the 
~~~Sel.! supra, note 147. 
110Pcoplc v. Carraru. 194 Misc. 2d 595.603 (N.Y. Sup. Cl. 2003). 
1 1~ 'Unitcd States v. Upham. 168 F.3d 532 (I st Cir. 1999). The court rejected the reasoning 
that ·'hy deleting the image$, [the defendant] ·abandoned' them and surrendered his right of 
privacy. Analogy is a hallowed tooi of legal reasoning: but to compare deletion to putting 
one's trash on the l;treet wh.:re it can be s;:archcd hy every passer-by ... is to reason by false 
analogy." !d. at 537 n.J. 
101SC'e California v. Grl·enwooJ. 4~6 U.S. 35.43 ( 193!<). 
t~!See supra note 159. 
11>.126 F. Supp. 2d 9291W.O. Tcx 1998). 
104/d. at 93:!. 
IO~ fc/. 
160/c/. at 933. 
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container, not the container itself. 107 Therefore, when the technician charged with the 
sole task of fixing the hard drive allowed police to search it, the police conducted a 
warrantless search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 1 ~8 ln this case, the 
technician did not have "joint access" to the hard drive for most purposes and the 
police could not have reasonably believed that he had the apparent authority to 
consent to the search. 1 ~9 
Yet another scenario constituting a v iolation of the Fout1h Amendment involving 
consent turned on a lack o f authority even though the consenter was the lessee of the 
premises and owned some of the computer equipment in question. In United States 
''· Durham,110 a case involving counterfeit currency. the defendant lived in an 
unattached garage next to his mother's house that had been converted into a 
bedroom. 171 Law enforcement suspected that computer equipment, some of which 
the mother owned, was being used to create counterfeit currency. 172 The mother 
consented to a search, but had no keys that worked on any of the doors.m Police 
subsequently pried open a window to gain entrance. 174 The mother had been 
completely denied access to the room, had never been in the room alone. and had 
never used the compute r equipment. 175 The court concluded that the pol ice fai led to 
make a reasonable inquiry as to the authority the mother had over the room and the 
computer. 176 Failure to make a reasonable inquiry as to the extent of the authority is 
unjusti fiab le. 177 
167/d. at 936-37. The court explained that ·'the Fourth Amendmem protection of closed 
computer files and hard drives is similar to the protection it affords a person' s closed 
containers and closed personal em:cts." !d. Furthermore, "a warrant is usually required to 
search the contents of a closed container, because the owner's expectation of privacy re lates to 
the contents of that container rather than to the container itself. !d. And that "(b)y placing 
data in files in a storage device such as his hard drive, . .. (the] Defendant manifested a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of those ti les. These 111es should therefore 
be afforded the full protection of the warrant requirement." !d. 
168/d. at 937. 
169/d. at 938. The court stated that. "it is clear that (the technician) d id not have actual 
authority to consent to a search of Defendant's hard drive. [The technician] was in possession 
of the unit for the limited purpose of repair." !d. Furthermore, it was unreasonable for law 
enforcement to believe that the technician had the authority. !d. They knew he was a 
technician and an FBI informant and only possessed the hard drive in a limited capacity. /d. 
17~o. 98-! 0051-02, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15482 (D. Kan. Sept. II, 1998). 
171 /d. at *2. 
172/d. at *3. 
m id. The defendant' s mother actually handed over three keys to the police officers, but 
nont: of them worked to gain entranc-e to the garage room. ld 
174ld. at *4. The court explained, ··when the officers were unable to enter the bedroom 
using one o f her keys. they tried to enter through the windows which would not open 
manually. The officers finally entered the room by prying open a screen window and crawling 
inside.' ' !d. 
m /d. at * l 0- I I. 
171>/d. at * 11 - 12. Here, ' 'the officer knew that the defendant had physically excluded his 
mother from the bedroom. He deliberately chose not to ask questions which should have 
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This is not to say that courts have not swung the other way on occasion and 
found there to be no violation of the Fourth Amendment when it comes to computers 
in general. In Walsh v. State,m a case involving child molestation. the defendant's 
wife consented to a warrantless search of a computer located in their home.17q The 
computer had been purchased by the wife and was available to the entire family, 
including their children. 180 While nothing in the record indicated the existence or use 
of password protection. the defendant nevertheless objected to the search on the 
grounds the history of his Internet browsing on the computer were private in that 
they were his ''personal thoughts and associations."1ft 1 The court disagreed with the 
defendant. 1M~ Co-inhabitants of a household assume the risk that any of the other co-
inhabitants can authorize a search of a common area.183 Where a computer is 
generally open and available to the entire family in a common area, any member of 
the fami ly may authorize a search of that computer. 184 
In another instance involving the upholding of the constitutionality of a search of 
a computer, the defendant's girlfriend phoned police to make a search of the 
computer where she suspected chi ld pornography. 1 ~5 In this case, the computer was 
in an open area. was not password-protected, and was used by others in the 
defendant's absence. 1R6 Other facts supporting the constitutionality of the search 
include the fact that the live-in girlfriend maintained joint access of the bedroom area 
where the computer was located and that the defendant attempted to teach the 
girlfriend how to use the computer. 187 The facts here show that officers could 
reasonably believe that the third party authorizing consent had apparent authority to 
do so.188 Of particular importance in this case is the emphasis the court places on the 
computer as having no password protection.189 While there is no discussion as to 
immediately occurred to any officer attempting to detennine in good faith whether Mrs. 
Durham had the authority to consent to enter the room ... !d. 
177/d. at *12 . 
1 7~512 S.E. 2d 408 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999). 
17Q /d. at 41 1. 
180/d. 
lSI /d. 
1 8~ /d. 
183Jd. at 412. 
18
'
1Jd. The court stated that ''[u)nder these circumstances, [the defendant's] wife had the 
authority 10 consent to the seizure of the computer. because she had common authority over 
the premises as well as owr the computer itselt:" !d. 
185United States v. Smith. 27 F. Supp. 2d 111 1 (C.D. Ill. 1998). 
186/d. at 1114. 
1~7/d. 
1gij/d. at 1116. 
189!n several places, the court references the lack of password protection on the machine. 
"Mr. Gasparin testilied that the computer was not password protected.'' !d. at 1114. ·'Ms. 
21Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009
300 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW (Vol. 57:279 
whether there would have been a different outcome if password protection were 
present, the court stated that "it is important to note that none of the officers who 
searched the computer found passwords on the computer," and that "this belies 
[d]efendant's c laim of exclusive and possessory control."190 The lack of passwords 
on the computer played a pivotal role in the outcome of the case. 
A third party's apparent authority over a computer does not strip the primary user 
of that computer of Fourth Amendment rights simply by virtue of the object in 
question be ing a computer. If the computer is in a common area of the living space 
and is generally used by the third party, then there is a lesser expectation of privacy 
and it is more reasonable for law enforcement to believe that the third party can 
indeed consent to a search. ''~ ' A lack of the presence of a password also 
demonstrates a lower expectation of privacy. 192 However, when the computer has 
been placed in a separate area where the third party has no or limited access, it is less 
reasonable for law enforcement to assume a third party's apparent authority to 
consent to a search.193 In any instance, it is still for law enforcement to take 
reasonable, minimal steps, such as asking questions, to determine whether the third 
party's consent is valid before conducting a warrantless search. 194 
VI. MAKING A MESS OUT OF COMPUTER SEARCHES, PRIVACY, AND THJRD-P ARTY 
CONSENT 
As previously mentioned, only three cases have come before courts dealing with 
third-party consent to search computers that were password-protected or otherwise 
contained a mechanism for privacy. The issues of password protection and what 
infom1ation law enforcement should know about the computer in question created a 
troubling outcome in each of the three cases. 
A. The First Two Circuit Decisions Lay the "Groundwork"? 
In United States v. Morgan,'95 a wife suspected her husband of viewing child 
pornography. After the spy software that she installed indicated as much, she 
contacted local law enforcement. 196 Although the wife had her own computer and 
never used the one in question, it was located in a common area of the house where 
Denise Walls, sister of Defendant, testified that if the officers were allowed access to DOS 
immediately, then the password protection must have been deactivated ." /d. '"Defendant 
testified that ... he had removed the passwords ... [and] admitted that certain graphics files 
could have been viewed without the need for passwords. Jd. "Neither Mr. Gasparin nor the 
FBI examiner who later examined the computer found any passwords on the computer 
system." /d. 
190/d at I l !6. 
''"See supra notes l 77-83 and accompanying text. 
192 See supra notes 188-89 and accompanying text. 
I 'IJ See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text. 
194See supra note 176 and accompanying texi. 
195435 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2006). 
1%/d. at 662. 
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h .,. h d 1<17 t e wt e a access-the basement. And although the computer had no password 
protection, the husband had installed software designed to erase Internet content. 198 
Regardless of the fact that she never used the computer and had her own computer 
elsewhere in the house,1w a fact she neglected to tell police prior to the search, the 
court relied on the apparent authority of the wife over the computer in upholding the 
constitutionality of the search.200 While the results of this case may be easier to 
swallow than the results of the Andrus case discussed below, it still raises 
unanswered questions of what constitutes privacy with respect to computers and 
exactly what information officers have to know prior to conducting a warrantless 
search. 
In United States v. Buckner.201 an on line fraud investigation led police to a home 
without a warrant with the intent to seize a computer.202 The wife fully consented to 
the search ing of a password-protected computer located in a common area o f the 
house primarily used by the husband.203 Based on the apparent authority of the wife, 
the court refused to suppress the results of the search.2w The court acknowledged 
that the husband, "(b)y using a password ... affirmatively intended to exclude ... 
others from his personal files."205 When the oflicers entered the home to seize the 
computer, it was on and visibly lit.2(16 Nevertheless, without looking for password 
protection or "any information on the computer," the officers proceeded to shut 
down the computer and take it with them for forensic analysis. 207 Furthermore, the 
197/d. 
19M/d. .. The eraser program eliminated much of the evidence of Defendant's viewing of 
child pornography, but for some unknown reason. the program did not delete . . . 
approximately 148 images ... reco\ered from the computer:· /d. 
1wThe court also concluded that because the wife was able to (essentially) sneak onto her 
husband's computer to install the spywarc software. she therefore in fact bad access to the 
computer to support an ofiicer·s reasonable belief in her apparent authority to conduct a 
warrantless search. !d. at 664. 
~00/d. at 663-64 (''If apparent authority existed at that time. later-discovered facts that 
might undermine the initial reasonable conclusion of third-party apparent authority are 
generally immaterial.''). 
201473 F. 3d 551 (4th C ir. 2007). 
202/d. at 553. 
203/d. 
20~/d. at 555-56. In a footnote. the court dl!clared that it was not deciding on the intentional 
avoidance or password discovery: .. We do not hold that the officers could rely upon apparent 
authority to search while simultaneously using mirroring or other technology to intentionally 
avoid discovery of password or encryption protection put in place in by the user:· !d. at 556 
n.3. 
2115/d. at 554. The court \\Cnt on to say, in a manner consistent with what one would think 
would lead to a suppression of the evidence. "it can not be said that . . . fthe husband) . . . 
assumed the risk that a joint user of a computer, not privy to password-protected riles. would 
permit others to search his files:· /d. 
206/d. at 553. 
2(17/d. 
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government indicated that its ·'forensic analysis software would not necessarily 
detect user passwords.''208 Even though the wife admitted she did not know much 
about the computer, the court further validated the admittance of the evidence by 
putting the onus on the wife for not indicating to the officers that passwords may 
have been prcsent.209 
Jn this case, we see the court struggling with passwords as ''locks," as well as 
what information officers should know. However, instead of requiring ofl'icers to 
ask minimal and appropriate questions to obtain a basic grasp of the surrounding 
circumstances. this court places the blame on the third-party wife for not informing 
the officers about any passwords. Somehow, the court arrived at a conclusion that 
effectively places an expectation on the layperson to perform the duties of law 
enforcement personnel. 
B. The Andrus Court Swings for the Fences 
In Andrus, federal law enforcement had been investigating and surveilling Ray 
Andrus, including his home and his work, for eight months on suspicion of child 
pornography.; 1n After such surveil lance, officers did not believe they had enough 
information to obtain a warrant and proceeded to conduct a "knock and talk."21 1 The 
police officers specifically brought a forensic computer expert with them to the 
Andrus homc.212 Ray Andrus's 91-year-old father greeted the officers at the door in 
his pajamas and allowed them into his homeY 3 The home belonged to the father, 
and Ray Andrus had his own bedroom while he lived there to take care of his aging 
parents.~ 1 4 Ray Andrus's private bedroom contained the only computer in the 
house.215 The father consented to the search of the computer.m The police expert 
used forensic software to bypass password protection on the computer and found 
tiles depicting child pomography.217 Only after the search returned results did the 
M id. (emphasis added). 
20~ /d. at 555. 
! 10United States v. Andrus, 4R3 F.3d 711, 713 (I Oth Cir. 2007). Authorities first became 
aware of Ray Andrus while performing an investigation into a third-party credit card hilling 
company. !d. This company "provided subscribers with access to websites containing child 
pornography.'' /d. Credit card information led the authorities to Ray Andrus after the 
nuthorities fou nd that "!t]he Andrus . . subscription was used to access a pornographic 
website called www.sunshineboys.com." I d. 
21 1/d 
213/d. 
2 1 ~/d. 
!IS/d. 
m'fcl. 
~ 17 /d. at 714. The court explained that ''lthe forensic expert] ... used [forensic software] 
to search for . .. picture files. He explained that clicking on the images ... allowed him to sec 
the pathname for the folders on the computer's hard drive. This .... revealed . .. file names 
sugge~tivc of child pornography. rHeJ estimated it took five minutes .. . :· !d. 
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police officer halt the forensic search on the grounds that a continuing conversation 
with the ti11hcr indicated he might not have the authority to consent.218 
In deciding on the admissibility of the evidenct! in Andrus. the court recognized 
that a computer with password protection is like a locked suitcase or briefcase.~19 
The court analogized to United States , .. Block.~21' where that court held a mother 
lacked authority to consent to the search of her son's locked footlocker when she did 
not have the key.221 The court further analogized the s ituation to Trulock v. Freeh,~~~ 
where that court held that although a third party had consent to a general search of 
the computer. that authority did not extend to the defendant's password-protected 
files.m Furthermore. the A11drus couri looked at instances where the location of the 
computer in the house played a role in determining third party-eonsent.m The couti 
recognized that when the computer is in a common area of a house, there is a more 
reasonable basis for officers to believe that the third party had "apparent authority" 
to consent to the search.m The court went on to say that "a personal computer is 
often a repository for private information the computer's owner docs not intend to 
share with othcrs."~2u With all this authority the court cited going in favor of 
suppressing the evidence. they nevertheless allowed admittance of the evidence.227 
21~/d. at 718 (citing United States v. Aaron. 33 F. App ·x 180 (6th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) 
and Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 200 I)). 
/d. 
2~0590 F. 2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). 
121/d. 
222275 F.3d 391 (lith Cir. 2001). 
223/d. at 403. 
224United States v. Andrus. 483 F .3d 71 I. 719 (I Oth Cir. 2007). 
225 /d. at 719-20. 
m id. at 7 18. The court emphasized its poilll by stating: 
[F]or most people, their computers are their most private spaces. People commonly 
talk about the bedroom as a ve1y private space, yet when they have parties, all the 
guests- including perft:ct strangers-arc invitl!d to toss their coats on the bed. But if 
one of those guests is caught exploring the host's computer, that wil l be his last 
invitation. 
m /d. at 722. Perhaps at least one underlying reason for the admittance of the evidence in 
this case, whether in the conscious or subconscious of the court, is the struggle between libeny 
and justice. While certainly beyond the scope of this Note. that struggle certainly weighs upon 
the courts. Often, the ·'motivation for these dt:cisions has been the link between judicially 
acknowledging a violation of Fourth Amendment privacy and suppressing reliable. 
incriminating evidence." Sherry t=. Colb. What is a Search? Two Concepwaf Flaws in Founh 
Amendment Doctrine am/ Som<! Hmt~ of a Remedy, 55 STA ~- L. REV. I 19, 121 (2002). This 
can certainly help to provide an explanation where some court decisions seem to r.:duce the 
protections of the Fourth Amendment. !d. ·'In other wQrds. because a holding that the Fourth 
Amendment applies in a particular case might free a guilty defendant. courts arc tempted to 
find no Fourth Amendment application ... /d. 
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Setting aside the glaring problems of the officer not even asking questions 
appropriate to determining the 91-year-old father's authority to consent, or that the 
ofticer did not even so much as look for a password, the evidence would seem to 
show that Ray Andrus satisfied the two-prong test associated with Fourth 
Amendment protection analysis.!2s First, the court itself cited case law to show that 
Ray Andrus had a subjective expectation of privacy when he password-protected his 
computer and kept it in a non-common area of the house-his own private room.229 
Second, as to the objective- or what society wou ld deem as reasonable-test, the 
court tlat out declared that computer owners believe that their computers are private 
and do not intend to share private information with others. 230 So how did the court 
find a way to let the evidence in? By allowing law enforcement to play dumb. 
The court put forth a myriad of explanations and reasons as to why they let the 
evidence in, even though, as mentioned above, the court itself so much as declared 
that Ray Andrus met the two-pronged test of Fourth Amendment analysis. 
Essentially. the court looked to not only the reasonableness of the officer's belief in 
the father's authority to consent, but also the ''mysterious witchcraft" of computers 
and passwords. While acknowledging that officers did not ask specific questions 
about the elderly father 's use of the computers, the coutt blamed the father for not 
indicating that he did nor use the computer231 The court further declared that if the 
situation looked reasonable, the officers did not need to ask clarifYing questions.231 
And although the court went to great lengths to compare the password-protected 
computer to a "locked box·· requiring a key. they held that determining the existence 
of the password was unnecessary. because it would not have been "obvious" to the 
<)fficers.m Furthermore. the court said that even though the c~)mputer required a 
password. there was nothing that showed the orticers "knew or had reason to 
believe" a password was in place. ~34 
These holdings create the absurd result of extending "apparent authority'' to an 
<llmost inlinilt: cnd . They al low police officers to skate around the Fourth 
Amendment by intentionally avoiding asking questions of th ird parties while 
obtaining consent, as well as allowing them to ignore password "locks" on 
;:~SI!e supru notc 1X and accompanying text. 
:~9See g<'neral(r A11drus, 4lD F.}d 711 (<:iting CU!>C law tO demonstrate there was no 
authority to sc;m.:h). 
:.<old at 71 1l-::!O. 
~ ~ 'hi. m no. 
~3~ /d. T he wurt thl.'n dismissed tho:: dissent 's argum<.:nt that such an inquiry would be 
minimal. !d. 
!d. 
~ ' l /d. :11 71 R. The court decl:-crcs: 
Linlikc f,)otlo~.:kcrs or suih:ases. where the presenct: of a locking device is generally 
apparc111 lly looking at the item. a '·Jock'' on the data within a computer is not apparent 
from a visual insp.:ction of the outside of the computer, espo::cially when the computer 
is in the "nff" position prior to the search. 
~ <J /d. at 72 1. 
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computers that, as shown, courts have held to be analogous to locks on physical 
items. 
VII. BRINGING THIRD-PARTY COI\SE:"JT OF W ARRANTLESS COMPUTER SEARCHES 
BACK Ut-:DER FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTI'CTION 
While warrantless computer searches conducted by third-party consent may be 
more of the exception than the norrn,zu holdings such as the ones in Andrus open up 
the floodgates of potential Fourth Amendment violations in this area. The solution is 
not to change the standard, but if courts are going to liken password-protected 
computers to locked boxes, it is imperative that they consistently apply those 
principles instead of dancing around it and allowing evidence in based on what is 
"reasonable under the circumstances." The fact is that computers are in a majority of 
American homes.236 It is not acceptable to allow law l.!nforccment to act as though 
they have no idea computers come with password protection. The fact that law 
enforcement has forensic technology to purposely avoid paf.:>word protcctionm 
negates the contention that willful blindness towards passwords is acceptable. 
Had the court in Andrus applied both the two-prong reasonable expectation of 
privacy test and the limits on apparent authority rationale to the warrantless 
password-protected computer search in a manner consistent with Fourth Amendment 
law as applied to similar scenarios. the exact opposite outcome would have resulted. 
It is both counter-productive and counter-intuitive to the kgal system to declare that 
passwords on computers are analogous to locks on boxes. and then state that law 
enforcement has no duty to even ask or look to see if password-protection is present. 
If Ray Andrus's room would have been locked. and the father did not have a key, the 
police officers would not have been able to enter the room. Simply put, a locked 
container supports a heightened expectation of privacy "hen a potential third-party 
consenter has no ability to provide a key to the lock on that container.m Third-party 
authority in these cases is far from apparent. A third party has .. no right .. . to 
consent to a search of personal property belonging to another person unless there is 
evidence of both common authority over and mutual usage of the property."D9 
Furthermore, "when police are told by a third rarty that the property belongs to 
another, the officers are obligated to make inquiries sufficient to establish that the 
person consenting to the search has both common control over the property and 
mutual use of it. "240 
Not requiring law enforcement to ask appropriate questions simply because the 
device is a computer steps on the very protection the Fourth Amendment is designed 
to provide. If law enforcement, in searching a physical container with third-party 
consent, used an X-ray machine to see the contents without so much as even looki ng 
m id. at 722 n.l (McKay. J .• dissenting). 
2
·
16See Households with Computl!rs: 1998 and 2003 . . ,upru note I 07 and accompanying 
text. 
131 See Thompson. supra note gq and acc:ompanying te'\t. 
238 Andrus, 483 F. 3d 711 (reiterating cases linding a privacy interest). 
ZlC)Marganet v. State, 927 So. 2d 52. 57 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
240/d. at 58. 
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at the front to see if a lock was present, any court would suppress the evidence. ln 
theory, the same should hold true for personal computers. The argument that 
password protection on a computer may not be "immediately visible" Jacks support. 
Simply turning on the machine shows whether password protection is enabled. 
Furthermore, the fact that a third-party consenter does not know if there is password 
protection is stark evidence to the contrary that he or she has any authority at all over 
the computer. 
A common sense, reasonable solution to the problem of warrantless computer 
searches based on third-party consent consistent with established principles is two 
fold: (I) Require officers to make minimal inquiries to the third party as to the 
ownership of the computer and what access he or she has to the computer system, 
and (2) Require officers, at a minimum, to tum on the computer to check for 
password protection. 
What may seem like reasonable solutions are exactly what the court in Andrus 
indicates are unreasonable. The burden of officers to find out if the third party has 
anything to do with the computer in question is minimal.241 Officers are only 
required to ask questions when the situation is ambiguous. In this context, similar 
questions that determine common ownership and access rights to physically locked 
items can be presented to the third party. Questions such as "Do you use this 
computer" and "Do you have the password (key) to log on to the computer?" are 
hardly a burdensome task for an officer, especially when it comes to protecting 
Fourth Amendment rights. Allowing law enforcement to "rely" on the surrounding 
circumstances in these cases is overly broad, especially when the courts are going to 
place the blame on the third party for not being the first to mention that there is 
password protection. 
further, it is not a burden on law enforcement to require them to look for the 
presence of a password prior to forensically extracting data. Surely no court has 
allowed evidence to stand where an officer could not "see" the lock on a physical 
container and cut a hole in the side to remove the contents. To indicate that not 
seeing a password negates the need to check for one is equally as disturbing as not 
requiring the asking of minimal questions to establish common authority. As Judge 
McKay put it in her dissent in Andrus, "the facts that a computer 'lock' may not be 
immediately visible does not render it unlocked."242 Simply requiring law 
enforcement to exercise due diligence by turning on the computer to look for a 
password will help solve this problem. 
As technology continues to play a bigger role in daily life, placing such minimal 
restrictions on law enforcement is consistent with Fourth Amendment principles of 
reasonableness. It also allows for the striking of a balance between the government's 
interest in protecting and serving society as a whole with the individual's right to 
privacy. While the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement may be riddled with 
exceptions such as third-party consent, it must not be forgotten that "the fourth 
amendment is quintessentially a regulation of the police-that, in enforcing the 
241 United States v. Andrus, 483 F.3d 7 I I, 724 (I Oth Cir. 2007) (McKay, J., dissenting). 
242/d. at 723 (McKay. J., dissenting). "[UJnlike the locked tile cabinet, computers have no 
handle to pull. But, like the padlocked footlocker, computers do exhibit outward signs of 
password protection: they display boot password screens [and] usemame/password log-in 
screens." !d. 
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fourth amendment, courts must police the police."w ln that vein, placing reasonable 
restrictions on police when they are performing their duties is certainly not a new 
concept. For example, when a suspect is lawfully arrested in his vehicle, police may 
search the passenger compartment of a car and any containers therein because those 
areas are within the immediate grabbing area of the arrestee and may contain a 
weapon.~44 However. police cannot search the tnmk2 • 5 Furthermore. if there is no 
arrest, but just a citation, there can be no searching simply based on that citation. ~•~> 
Even the "plain-view rule,'' which allows police to seize immediately recognizable 
contraband or evidence of a crime cannot be used to justify warrantless searches or 
seizures. Restrictions on the plain-view doctrine require police to be lawfully in the 
position from which they see the item. and prohibits further examination of the item 
unless it is immediately recognized as something unlawtul."47 All of these are 
reasonable restrictions and safeguards designed not only to aid police, but also to 
enforce the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and ensure individual privacy. 
Establishing rules for police conduct, which go as far as possible to ensure their 
safety as well as protect individual privacy, is also present in another type of 
warrantless search- those occasions where police patrolling the street believe crime 
to be afoot. ln Teny v. Ohio,N~ the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the practice whereby 
a police officer can stop a suspect based on reasonable suspicion that he has or is 
about to commit a crime, briefly detain him, ask questions, and perform a limited 
search on the person to see if he is canying a weapon. ~49 While the overarching 
principle in allowing the limited search is the officer's safety, the search is just 
that- limited. The officer may only perform a pat down/frisk on the exterior of the 
clothing. If no questionable objects are felt, the officer may not go digging into the 
pockets of the suspect.250 While many may have seen this as an expansion of police 
power, the restrictions on the police are reasonable- limited ddc:rHion, questioning. 
and searching. The police know what their boundaries are in that type of situation. 
Similarly drawn boundaries are also now required in rerms of warrantless searches or 
password-protected computers based on third-party consent. Otherwise, there lacks 
an objective basis through which courts can accurately assess the constitutionality of 
such intrusions. 
A locked container shows a manifestation of an expectation of privacy. The fact 
that something is locked provides a limit to any authority that a third-party consenter 
may have. Asking a couple questions about a computer, a practice commensurate 
with establishing authority over physical objects with locks on them, is a non-
24;Traccy Maclin. Wilen the Cure for the Fourth Amendment Is W01:ve than the Disea:>e, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. I, 6 ( 1994) (emphasis added). 
244Ncw York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454.460 ( 1981 ). 
24~ Jd. at 461 n.4. 
~4bKnowks v. Iowa. 525 U.S. I IJ, 118 ( 199ll). 
"
47 Arizona v. Hicks. 480 U.S. 321 , 327-29 { 1987). 
148392 U.S. I ( 1968). 
249/d. at 30. 
250/d. 
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burdensome way to uphold the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Law 
enforcement should not be able to sidestep the protections of the Fowth Amendment 
because the vinual world can be searched with technology that bypasses locks. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The very words of the Fourth Amendment require a warrant to conduct a search 
or seizure. The Supreme Court has recognized that " the possession of a warrant by 
officers conducting [a] ... search greatly reduces the perception of unlawful or 
intrusive police conduct. by assuring the individual whose property is searched or 
seized the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limi ts 
of his power to search."251 Relying on the apparent authority of a third party to 
consent to the search of a password-protected computer can seriously infringe on the 
right to be free from warrantless searches and seizures. The few court decisions that 
have touched on the topic apply a liberal standard. Whether that stems from a fear or 
misunderstanding of technology, the results amount to skating around the protections 
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Regardless, Jaw enforcement's use of 
forensic technology specifically designed to bypass passwords negates the contention 
that officers can be oblivious to the existence of password-protected computers. 
Requiring officers to ask minimally burdensome questions of the third party, as well 
as physically checking for the existence of a password, will bring this area of the law 
back into accord with the established principle that law enforcement cannot rely on 
the consent of a third party to search a locked area when that third party does not 
have a key.252 Clearly, requiring anything less in an increasingly technology-filled 
society results in a grave deprivation of the very protections the Fourth Amendment 
is designed to provide. 
~ 5 1 Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
mUnited States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535 (4th Cir. 1978). 
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